December, 1927.

KEEPING THE UNIFORM STATE LAWS UNIFORM
WILLIAM M. HARGEST
The subject of uniformity in laws seems to have caught the
imagination of many people. It is a sort of shibboleth of the
age- But uniformity can be overdone. The tendency of the
unthinking and uninformed is to imagine that the panacea for
most governmental ills is uniformity, and that the panacea for all
diversity of law on any given subject is an act of Congress.
Recently there have been frequent attempts to have Congress
enter fields of legislation heretofore properly within the exclusive
domain of the states.' Many national business organizations
believe that the remedy for the particular troubles that confront
them in their several spheres of activity lies in uniformity and are
endeavoring to frame and secure the adoption of uniform legislation, state and federal, affecting their particular interests.
They, perhaps, like very many people, do not know that there is
an organization, official in its nature, formed exclusively for the
purpose of considering upon what subjects it is desirable to undertake uniformity in state legislation and of preparing with the
utmost care uniform laws to be adopted by the several states upon
those subjects approved by it. It is the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, which has been in existence since 189o. Some of our best legislation, particularly on
commercial subjects, has resulted from its labors, such as the
Negotiable Instruments Act, the Uniform Warehouse Receipts
Act, the Uniform Sales Act, and the Uniform Partnership Act.
There are, of course, many others.
The late Simeon E. Baldwin, former Governor and Chief
Justice of Connecticut, and once President of the American Bar
Association, said that the example furnished by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws led to the
formation of the Hague Conference. 2 If that be true and the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
1

Some phases of this tendency have been discussed by Hon. James M. Beck
in "THE VANISHING RIGHTS OF THE STATES" (1926).
2 (1904) i7 HARv. L. REv. 400, 403.
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had accomplished nothing else, it would have abundantly justified
its existence. However, the ignorance concerning this organization and its functions is colossal, even among lawyers, legislators
and judges. It is often regarded, by those who ought to be better
informed, as a committee or a section of the American Bar Association. This misconception arises because the Conference meets
for a week immediately preceding the American Bar Association
and at the same place, and it works with and is approved by the
American Bar Association. The American Bar Association is,
of course, a voluntary organization, whereas the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is an official association, composed of commissioners appointed under the authority
of the various states, territories, the District of Columbia, Porto
Rico and the Philippine Islands.
The work of the National Conference, in the express preparation of proposed statutes, is done with extreme care. When
an individual or an organization suggests to the Conference that
uniformity is desirable upon a particular subject, the suggestion
is referred to a committee to first determine whether the subject
is one upon which uniformity in the laws of the several states
should be undertaken. The report of that committee is then laid
before the National Conference at an annual meeting. If the
subject is considered a proper one for uniformity, the matter is
referred either to a special or to a standing committee, which committee, often with the aid of an expert, examines the laws of the
several states and sometimes of foreign countries, and reports a
tentative draft of an Act to the Conference. The tentative draft
is considered, section by section, sometimes consuming several
days. It is then referred back to the committee and must be considered, section by section, at a second annual meeting of the
National Conference. It often happens that the same statute is
under consideration by a committee, and by the Conference itself,
in this way, for three or four years. Great care is given not only
to the subject matter, but to phraseology. The frailty of the
human language is such, however, that notwithstanding the care
with which these Acts are prepared, they sometimes are subject to
more than one interpretation.

18o

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

How, then, can the uniform laws be kept uniform? The
answ er is, by the courts. It is one thing for the legislatures to
pass uniform state laws and quite another thing to have them so
interpreted and construed by the courts as to keep them uniform.
The attention of the National Conference was long ago attracted
to the fact that many of the courts failed to recognize the importance of a construction that would preserve uniformity, and that
organization has been striving for some years to bring this matter
forcefully to the attention of the judiciaries.
It is now well settled that where a statute has been copied
from the laws of another state it is to be assumed that the legislature accepted the construction which was placed upon it by the
courts of the state from which it was taken. This principle is
now of universal application. Realizing that the courts often
overlook it, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws endeavors to have it applied and somewhat
extended. To that end the National Conference, about fifteen
years ago, determined to insert a section in every act that was
recommended by the Conference, as follows:
"This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to
effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of
those states which enact it."
Some of the courts recognized the importance of keeping the
uniform acts uniform, even before this provision of the uniform
statutes was brought to their attention. In 1913 a New York
court referred to the fact that shortly after the Negotiable Instruments Act was passed a number of decisions of the courts failed
to recognize the change made in the prior law of that State, but
that the later cases without expressly overruling the earlier
decisions had recognized it. The Court said: 3
"The desirability of uniformity in the laws of various
states with reference to negotiable instruments is so obvious,
and the legislative intent to harmonize our theretofore conflicting decisions with those of other jurisdictions is, to my
mind, so clearly expressed, that full effect should be given
thereto."
'Broderick & Bascom Rope Co. v. McGrath, 8i Misc. 199, 142 N. Y. Supp.
497 (913).
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Other courts, since the insertion of the provision above
referred to, have gone so far as to regard a decision of another
state construing a uniform law as obligatory rather than advisory.
For example, the Supreme Court of Utah, after referring to the
language of the statute above quoted, said: 4
"If, therefore, the section of the Uniform Sales Act
here in question has been construed by the court of last resort
of any state in which the Uniform Sales Act is in force, then
I conceive it to be the duty of this court to follow such construction in order to comply with the spirit and purpose of
section 5183, supra, and to maintain the uniformity of the
provisions of the Uniform Sales Act. It would be utterly
futile for the legislatures of the several states to adopt uniform laws upon any subject if each court of the several states
followed the notion of its members with regard to how a
particular provision should be construed and applied."
And the Supreme Court of Vermont, referring to the above provision in its statute, said: 5
"In view of this requirement, decisions of the highest
courts in other states having such enactment, involving its
interpretation or construction, are precedents of more than
persuasive authority. Speaking generally, they are precedents by which we are more or less imperatively bound, in
cases where similar questions are presented."
Notwithstanding the principle declared by these tribunals,
which we conceive to be the correct one, the courts have rather
consistently failed to preserve uniformity. There are two outstanding reasons for this failure. One is the tendency of courts
to adhere to stare decisis, and the other the failure to even refer
to the statute law of their own state which governs the principle
in the case.
The first reason is illustrated in several Missouri decisions
which involved the question of a restrictive endorsement of a
negotiable instrument. The leading case of Bank of Indian Ter'Stewart v. Hansen, 62 Utah 281, 218 Pac. 95g (923).
Atna Chemical Co. v. Spaulding and Kimball Co., 98 Vt 51, 126 AtI.
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ritory v. First National Bank,6 was decided before the Negotiable
IllstruiuicntsAct went into effect in that state. The Act plainly
changed the law on the subject in Missouri. But in three cases 7
decided subsequently the same ruling was made as in the leading
case. In none of these cases was the language of the statute
referred to or considered and the decision was simply placed upon
the authority of the former decision. The courts of Arkansas,
however, clearly illustrate what would happen when there is a
proper regard for the statute. In that state the case of Johnson
5
v. Schnabaum,
referring to a restrictive endorsement, was decided before the passage of the Act, which changed the state law
on the subject. When the same question arose subsequently in
FirstNational Bank v. Brunk,' the former decision was overruled
because, as the Court said, "the opinion in this case was delivered
prior to the passage of the Negotiable Instruments Act."
Referring to the other reason, namely, the failure of courts
to cite the statutes of their own states, an astounding situation is
disclosed. A recent authoritative and comprehensive survey 10
of uniform law enforcement in the states which have adopted
such legislation reveals the following significant facts:-the
courts in states which have adopted the Uniform Sales Act, when
deciding questions to which that Act applied, failed to even refer
to the Act in 353 cases while 941 cases cited it; as to the Negotiable Instruments Act, ignored it in 689 cases and referred to it
in 1717 cases; as to the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, ignored it in 70 cases and mentioned it lO9 times; as to the Uniform
PartnershipAct, failed to refer to it in 59 cases and cited it in 78
cases; and as to the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, ignored it 12
times and mentioned it 85 times. And similarly in the matter of
iog Mo. App. 665, 83 S. W. 537 (1904).
National Bank of Rolla v. National Bank, 154 Mo. App. 624, 125 S. W.
513 (I91O) ; National Bank of Commerce v. Mechanics Bank, 146 Mo. App.
58o, 127 S. W. 429 (191o) ; Citizens Trust Co. v. Ward, 195 Mo. App. 223, 190
S. W. 364 (1916).
'86 Ark. 82, iog S. W. 1163 (i9o8).
9 17o Ark. 583, 28o S. W. 372 (1926).
"EDWARD
1926).
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various other Uniform Acts, the same judicial disregard has
obtained. However, it is worthy of note that in cases to which
the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, the Uniform Limited Partnership Act and the Uniform Desertion and Non-support Act
applied, the courts in no instance failed to cite the said Acts. If
the courts continue thus to disregard the statutes complete uniformity is hopeless.
The National Conference of Commissioners did not rest its
efforts to bring about uniformity of interpretation with the insertion of the provision referred to above. In 192o a volume I" on
uniform state laws was edited and published under its auspices
in which were gathered the decisions on the various statutes up to
that time, and which included a comprehensive table showing the
section numbers of each uniform act compared with the section
numbers of the corresponding acts as adopted in the various
states, so that the courts might have ready reference thereto.
And further, in 1923 the National Conference of Commissioners
urged the publishers of annotated and selected cases and the editors of digests, whenever possible, in reporting cases that cited
a uniform act, to cite the section of the original act, as well as the
section number of the statute under interpretation. In that same
year the Pennsylvania Commissioners addressed to the judges of
the courts of that state a letter calling attention to both of the
above-mentioned publications," - so that the judges might have
ready reference to the interpretation of the uniform laws in the
other states.
For years the National Conference of Commissioners has
had a standing committee on Uniformity of Judicial Decisions,
which annually reported the decisions construing uniform state
laws, noting those which cited the acts, and those which applied
but did not cite them. This work, however, has been superseded
by the annotated publication mentioned above,' 3 revised supplements to which are issued periodically." This committee also
made and reported to the Conference in 1925 a comprehensive
' CHL.uas T. Tmmuy, UnFoR
'Supra notes io and ir.
''Supra note io.

STATE LAWS IN THE UN7,D STATEs (1920).
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table N'hich is printed in the Handbook of the Conference for
that year, showing the section numbers of all the uniform acts
adopted in the several states, compared with the section numbers
of the original acts as recommended by the National Conference.
There is yet another way in which diversity is introduced
into uniform statutes. Much of our great volume of legislation
in this country is the result of efforts on the part of individuals
or organizations to pass laws to change conditions where there is
no extended demand for such change. Thus many laws are
passed merely to meet local situations. So it sometimes happens
that when a uniform statute is passed in some state, a successful
effort is made by such an organized group to amend it in that
state although there is no general demand for such change.
Thereupon diversity is immediately introduced.
The only proper way to amend uniform statutes is to call the
attention of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to the need of amendment. That Conference,
as experience in the past has shown, then considers the question
in the same way that it considers an original Act.. When satisfied
as the Conference sometimes is, that an amendment is desirable,
it prepares such an amendment with care, and recommends it for
adoption to the several states. An observance of this rule would
also go a long way toward keeping the uniforth statutes uniform.
If the ideal of complete uniformity of these laws is to be
realized, in practice as well as in theory, the surest means to that
end is the full and complete cooperation of both the courts and
the various state legislatures. Let the courts recognize the legislative declaration that the statute is to be interpreted so as to keep
it uniform, and apply the doctrine of the Utah and Vermont cases,
quoted above, to the effect that the construction placed on a uniform statute by the court of another state is rather of binding
force and authority than merely persuasive. And a legislature
which has accepted the work of the National Conference on Uniform State Laws and passed a statute recommended by it for the
very purpose of making the law uniform, should accept no amendment to that statute unless the amendment also comes from the
same source.

